Why did the USSR collapse? The question is of major political importance. If the problem is inherent to socialism, socialism cannot be the solution to the ills of capitalism. If the cause lies somewhere else, it must be understood and avoided if a socialist project is to succeed. The book’s authors, who are Marxists, argue that although the USSR was in need of reforms, these were far from fatal flaws; instead, its demise was due to right-deviation policies adopted by Gorbachev in 1986.
Philosophically, the authors trace two threads of Soviet thinking. The first thread, to which the authors are most sympathetic, connects Lenin, Stalin, and Andropov. This strain placed the proletarian class at the forefront while hoping to eliminate class devisions through the building of socialism. Had Andropov’s reforms continued past his untimely death, the USSR would likely have continued (the authors point to remaining socialist states as illustrative proof). The second strain is represented by Bukharin, Khrushchev and Gorbachev, and reflects petite bourgeois ideology that favours compromise with capitalism and downplays the importance of the proletariate in favour of a unified mass.
The strengths of the book are the authors' familiarity with socialist debates and their ability to situate policy decisions in this context, as well as their detailed presentation of the problems facing the Soviet Union by the 1980s. The discussion of the “second economy” — extralegal or illicit trade outside the planned economy — was particularly thorough and convincing as a contributing factor. The authors also provide clear, compelling rebuttals of several typical alternative explanations for the USSR’s collapse. The work is well-organized and strikes a good balance between historical detail and general themes such that their arguments are generally well-supported without getting lost in minutiae.
The weakness of the book is that it remains unclear how the USSR should have navigated their difficulties. Although the second economy is elevated as one of the most important points of failure, I am not convinced that the relatively small and measured reforms the authors advocate would have solved this problem. Closer comparison with China, Vietnam and Cuba’s economic policies would have done much to strengthen their case. In particular, to what extent can capitalist relations be re-introduced into a socialist system to address certain economic problems without causing instability or unwanted excesses and crises? However, I did appreciate the authors' point that the goal is not only to develop the productive forces but also to "perfect the relations of production." The authors overly lean on the word "revisionism" to build their case for Gorbachev’s missteps, and I think scrubbing their argument of this bit of Marxist jargon would have led to a sharper critique. Additionally, the question of national identity remains murky. Although the authors show how national differences led to fracturing and although they emphasize the importance of understanding nationalism, it remains unclear what specific actions could have ameliorated the situation, or why it arose when and where it did. The solution appears to be to simply not allow nationalism to develop — but this is easier said than done. Quelling nationalism is not so dissimilar to chauvinistic oppression, and oppression can provoke its own destructive reaction. Similarly, self-determination and democracy are closely related, and a socialism that does not also strive to perfect democracy—rule by the people—is just as bad as one that does not strive to perfect the relations of production. Finally, while the authors engage with Western scholarship on the USSR's collapse, there was little treatment of Eastern — particularly Chinese —scholarship, possibly due to a language barrier.
Overall, this is an essential read, if not quite complete. The definitive study on this crucial question remains to be written.